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UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, LOCALS 4347, 4413,
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Copper Division, Kennecott Copper Corporation, 60-BR-236,
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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
UNI'TED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL NO. 5486, et al,

Appellants,
vs.

Case No.
9322

B01\RD OF REVIEW OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,
et al,

Respondents

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

'THE FORM OF THE RECORD BELOW
The case on review consolidates five class and one individual decision. Pursuant to stipulation of the parties, one
joint petition \vas filed.
In order to refer with facility to the transcripts, exhibits
and documents of record, the following references will be
observed:

( 1) Board of Review File #60-BR-230, containing the
record of United Steelworkers of America, Local
5486, will be referred to as BR-230 (R. 1 et seq.)
l
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(2) Board of Review File #60-BR-231, containing the
record of Elvere R. Davis, will be referred to as
BR-231 (R. 1 et seq.)
(3) Board of Review File #60-BR-235, containing the
record of International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, Local1438, will be referred to as BR-235
(R. 1, et seq.)
( 4) Board of Review File #60-BR-236, containing the
record of United Steelworkers of America, Locals
4347, 4413, 5120 and 4329, will be referred to as
BR-236 (R. 1 et seq.)
(5) Board of Review File #60-BR-237, containing the
record of International Union of Mine, ~Jill and
Smelter Workers, Locals 485 and 392, and Office
Employees International Union, Local 286, \\'ill
be referred to as BR-23 7 (R. 1 et seq.)

NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellants here seek to review orders of the Utah
Industrial Commission which affirmed decisions of its Appeals
Referee, denying claimants above eligibility for unemployment
benefits.
Initially the Unemployment Compensation Division
awarded benefits effective November 22, 1959, to Kennecott's
technical laboratory employees, represented by Steelworkers
Local # 5486. Similar awards allowing benefits to Kennecott
clerical employees at the Utah smelter, represented by Steelworkers Local 4329 were made effective December 28, 195~
Both awards, however, were reversed by a decision of the
Appeals Referee on January 15, 1960 and March 10, 1960.
All other claimants were denied benefits by the Unemployment
2
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Cotnpensation Division and Appeals Referee; timely petitions
to the Board of Review were filed; and in each case, on July 8,
1960, the Appeals Referee's decisions denying benefits to all
claitnants were affirmed.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nineteen separate local and autonomous labor unions
had working agreements and contracts between each un1on
and Kennecott Copper Corporation, Utah Division, which
expired by their terms on June 30 and July 31, 1959.
It \vill be necessary to designate these local unions through
their contractual relationship with the company for easy reference.

United Steelworkers of America
Local 4413 represents 713 production and maintenance
workers at the company's refinery.
Local 5120 represents 47 clerical workers at the company's refinery.
Local 4347 represents 1160 production and maintenance
workers at the company's smelter.
Local 4329 represents 34 clerical workers at the company's smelter.
Local 5486 represents 3 5 laboratory and technical workers at the company's Arthur mills.

International Union of Mine Mill and Smelter Workers
1

Local 392 represents 1398 production and maintenance
employees at the company's Arthur-Magna mills.
Local 485 represents 1188 production and maintenance
\vorkers at the company's Bingham mine.
3
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International Brothefhood of Electrical Workers
Local 1438 represents 68 power station employees at
the Central Power Station.

Office Employees International Union
Local 286 represents 99 clerical and office workers at
the company's Bingham mine.
Elvere R. Davis was employed as a carpenter in the company's mill and was a member of Local 392, Mine-Mill Union.
In addition to these unions, the company had working
agreements with local unions: 692 Mine-Mill Local, 1845
Electrical Workers, Lodge 670 Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen & Enginemen, Lodge 506 Order of Railroad Carmen
& Brakemen, Lodge 1045 Brotherhood of Railroad Carmen of

America, Local 3 Operating Engineers, Local 1081 Electrical
Workers, Lodge 568 Machinists, Lodge 15 5 System Federation,
and Lodge 844 Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Engtnemen.
Beginning in April, 1959, all unions involved attempted
to negotiate new \vorking agreements.

When on August 1,

1959, all parties were still in negotiations, each of the former
agreements was extended on a day-to-day basis to August 10,
1959. On this latter date, because of a strike called, the con1pany ceased its operation, except for certain maintenance and
supervisory work.
The history of bargaining between the separate locals and
Kennecott Copper Corporation goes back to the late 1930's
and was conducted on the basis of individual union bargaining.

At times each of the local unions presented certain common
bargaining demands such as in the field of health and \Yelfare

4
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benefits through a nUnity Council," but as each negotiation was
concluded, separate contracts \vere signed by the cornpany
and each local union claiming bargaining rights. The particular
contracts \V hich are of record demonstrate that each union
was the sole bargaining agent for the particular employees
certified through the National Labor Relations Board election
procedures.
1'here is some conflict in the testimony as to whether
Electrical Workers Local1438 ever formally struck the company
or directly participated in the work stoppage. On October
31 ,1959, Electrical Workers Local 1438, BR-235 (R. 017018) advised the company it was not on strike, and, in turn,
ordered the Unity Council not to list that local as one of the
striking unions in their advertisements, publicity or demands
to the company. Previously this local through its business
manager, one T. E. Burke, had orally disaffirmed the local's
involvement in the strike and mailed the letter to the company
to verify the fact. The company's letter to this local on Novetnber 2, 1959, acknowledged that this local was not considered a striking union and effected a day-to-day extension
of the old agreement. BR-235 (R. 018). Arrangements for
the return of day-to-day people to the Central Power Station
followed this exchange of correspondence, and provisions of the
old contract were thus reinstituted for these electrical workers.
Following the shutdown, the company halted power production
and maintained its power needs through purchase from Utah
Po\ver & Light Company. By November 12, 1959, six or seven
men1bers of the Electrical Local had returned to work at the
Central Power Station but the remaining 65 to 70 employees were
not recalled until the total strike settlement around January 29,
5
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1960.No employee of Local1438 performed picket duties at any
time and the returning employees crossed the picket lines after
November 12th, BR-235 (R. 071). These workers continued
on the job until the end of the strike. Local 1438 finally settled
their new agreement with the company January 7, 1960. The
company supplied power to its departments through purchases
from the Utah Power & Light Company until January 29, 1960,
maintaining that on the basis of the power necessary, the plant
could be more adequately operated by power purchase and
consequently took the position there was no work available
for the 65 to 70 other members of this unit. Notwithstanding
this disavowal of the strike, the resumption of day-to-day
contract, and the return of men recalled by the company by
November 12, the Unemployment Compensation Division
ruled that the remaining 60-70 members were disqualified
because of their participation in the strike.
Kennecott Copper Corporation's production activities in
Utah prior to August 10, 1959, were carried on chiefly, as
follows: the ore is mined at Bingham Canyon, Utah; then
hauled by rail so1ne 15 miles north to the concentration mills
at Magna and Arthur, Utah; concentrates are transported to
the smelter; and the main smelter product is taken to the
refinery. The mills, smelter and refinery are all situated within
a radius of about three miles. Prior to January 1, 1959, the
smelter \vas O\vned and operated by the American Smelting
& Refining Company, as it had been for many years previously.
The smelter was purchased on that date by Kennecott and
operated by the company thereafter.
The claimants here number in excess of 4,000 etnployees
and are n1embers of various separate and autonomous local
6
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unions. The electrical workers are a trade unton. The steel
workers are an industrial union. Similarly, other workers belong
to trade, craft and industrial unions. Some are affiliated with
the APL-CIO and others are not. Indeed, on many occasions
historically the unions have battled each other for \vork jurisdiction rights. Some contracts provide for job evaluation
while other contracts create job rate classications. Insurance,
health and welfare payments are maintained by different
carriers and are under different programs. Hiring practices
differ on the basis of plant and departmental requirements.
The smelter has its superintendent, the refinery its superintendent, as do the mines and mills. Seniority practices differ
with each contract. As to total plant shutdowns, particular
plant seniority exists. As to advances in position, departmental
seniority exists. Employees in the smelter cannot bump across
to the refinery, nor can seniority be claimed between mine or
mill, nor can departmental employees bump across departmental lines.
Negotiations to settle the strike were carried on between
the company and the individual unions involved after August
10 \vith the assistance of federal mediators.

The following chart shows the date each union reached
contract settlen1ent with the company:

United Steel Workers of America
Local 4413
Local 5120
Local 4347
Local 4329
Local 5486

November
November
November
November
November

21,
21,
21,
21,
21,

1959
1959
1959
1959
1959

7
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International Union of Mine, Mill and
Smelter Workers
Local 392
December 16, 1959
Local 692
December 16, 1959
Local 485
December 16, 1959
International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers
Local 1845

December 22, 1959

Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen & Enginemen
Lodge 670

December 24, 1959

Order of Railroad Carmen &
Brakemen
Lodge 506

December 24, 1959

Brotherhood of Railroad Carmen
of America
Lodge 1045

December 27, 1959

0 perating Engineers
Local 3

December 30, 1959

Office Employees International Union
Local 286

January 4, 1960

International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers
January 8, 1960
Local 1438
January 18, 1960
Local 1081
International Association of Machinists
Local 568
January 27~ 1960
System Federation
Lodge 155

January 27, 1960

Brotherhood of Locomotive
Fire1nen & Enginemen
Lodge 844

January 27, 1960

8
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It \vill be noted above that the Steelworkers Locals' settle-

Inents on l~ove1nber 21, 1959, paved the way for the strike's
end.
'The s1nelter etnployees (Steelworkers Locals 4347 and
-1329) following ratification of their agreements November 21,
1959, returned to work pursuant to a strike settlement agreement \vhich called for their ((prompt return," BR-236 (R. 033).
Between November 22 and November 24, 1959, 708 smelter
employees were back at work while 167 were scheduled off.
/dl but 96 of the 1170 on the smelter payroll had returned
to \vork by November 30, 1959 BR-236 (R. 059). The smelter
clerical employees were called back according to seniority
qualifications in line of work.
On the afternoon shift, December 1, 1959, pickets of the
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen and Order
of Railroad Carmen and Brakemen were established at the
smelter. This was the first date railroad brotherhood workers
picketed the sn1elter property since the strike commenced
August 10, 1959. However, smelter employees did not leave
their jobs when the pickets appeared. The railroad brotherhoods commenced their picketing when it was learned that
the company was attempting to utilize motor transport common carriers to move smelter products. The steelworkers,
\\'ell aware that it would be futile to attempt to cross a picket
line without inviting violence, respected the line. By December
25, 1959, the railroad brotherhoods signed strike agreements,
\vithdrew the pickets and a general recall of the production
and maintenance and clerical workers began at the sn1elter and
refinery.
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During the week ending January 10, 1960, there were 371
employees of Steelworkers Local 4347 laid off after completing
five working days. Layoffs were according to plant seniority.
The reason given was that the supply of ore at the smelter
was exhausted. Each employee was given a blue separation
slip supplied by the Unemployment Office, indicating the
separation was due to a reduction in force due to strike at
other plants, BR-236 (R. 058). During the week ending
January 16, 1960, 550 additional production and smelter
employees were laid off on the same basis. On January 18,
1960, there were 242 employees still working at the smelter on
maintenance, cleanup and material inventory. On January 20,
1960, six junior clerical and technical employees from the
smelter were told not to report to work because there was no
work for them. They were given blue separation slips. On
January 31, 1960, 274 employees remained on the payroll
of the smelter. Between February 1 and 4, 1960, the employees
laid off were recalled according to their plant seniority and
returned to work. On February 4, 1960, there were 114
employees out of 115 3 who had not returned to the smelter.
All of the facts set forth above are digested from the record
BR-236 (R. 058-061), Company Exhibits K and L.
The refinery story is digested at BR-236 (R. 040-042).
following ratification of the refinery contract, November 21,
1959, over 400 of the Steelworkers Local 4413 employees
were called back to the refinery the week of November 23,
1959. The ren1aining 300 were not called back nbecause no
work was available for them." BR-236 (R. 078). Refinery
employees suffered the satne fate as smelter employees \vhen
the railroad brotherhoods picketed the refinery early in De10
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cen1ber. \\/ ith the removal of these picket lines December 25,
refinery employees \vere also recalled BR-236 (R. 105-106).
Two of the three refinery furnaces were closed January 4 to
15, 1960, with one continuing to January 29, 1960. Production
and maintenance work was resumed at the refinery on February
8, 1960 .
.Anticipating vacation shutdown schedule for August 1023, 1959, prior to the strike, company had stockpiled concentrates at the smelter which enabled the smelter and refinery
to operate on a steady basis for a two-week period. BR-236
(R. 104). During December, 1959, and January, 1960, the
company also shipped for refining approximately 9800 tons
of copper anodes outside the state, BR-236 (R. 105).
The Mine-Mill unions were the second group to reach
final contract agreement with the company on December 16,
1959, but none of these employees were recalled to work until
February 6, 1960. Following contract ratification by Minel\1ill unions, other unions maintained picket lines at the mines
and mills which "'ere withdrawn as each local union settled
its contract.
Final contract settlements were made January 27, 1960,
with the Machinists, System Federation and Brotherhood of
Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, paving the way for the
return of Kennecott's employees to the mines and mills on
February 6, 1960.
Steelworkers Local 5486, representing the unit of clerical
and laboratory employees at the mills, also ratified and approved the contract with other steelworkers unions November
21, 1959, and expressed willingness to resume their former
11
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work and perform their former duties at the Mills, BR-230
(R. 011), but as late as January 13, 1960, had not been recalled
to their jobs. Originally the Unemployment Compensation
Department declared these claimants eligible for unemployment benefits on the ground there was no work available for
them. This decision was later reversed by the Appeals Referee
and affirmed.
Elvere R. Davis ( 60-BR-231) maintains that he had been
separated from his employment with the company three days
before the strike and was given a blue separation notice BR231 (R. 001). Mr. ·navis' claim was also denied even though
he had been separated from work prior to the strike.
Office Employees Local 286 are engaged in the mtne
area BR-23 7 (R. 083) and reached a contract settlement
January 3, 1960. They had discontinued picketing within a
few days after the strike commenced, August 10. Following
contract ratification, Local 286 president contacted the Railroad Brotherhoods to seek passes through the picket lines
but they were rejected.
The critical point found in all cases by the Appeals Referee
is that all operations of Utah Division, Kennecott Copper
Corporation, constitute a single establishment, on the basis
of general and specific business administration and company
control as well as proximity, integrality and interdependence
of the company's various production departments. The Appeals
Referee concluded in all cases that the entire Utah Division
of the company consists of one establishment at which the
clain1ants were last employed, BR-23 7 (R. 087), and further.
it concluded that all claimants became unemployed due to J
12
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stoppage of work which existed because of a strike involving
their grade, cL.bs, or group at that establishment. The disqualification was applied to all claimants as of August 10,
L959, and continued through February 6, 1960. Timely appeals
from the Board of Review's decision were taken in all cases.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
The Board of Review erred as a matter of law and fact
in

deny~ng

the claimants benefit·s in holding:

1. That Utah Copper Division, Kennecott Copper Corporation, operation in Utah constitutes a single factory or establishment within the meaning of the Act, Section 5 (d) .
2. That the work stoppage did not end until February 6,
1960, when the plant resumed "normal operations" for:
(a) The workers represented by United Steelworkers
of America, Local 5486;
(b) The workers represented by International Br·otherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 1438;
(c) The workers represented by International Union
of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, Locals 485
and 392;
(d) The workers represented by International Union
of Office Employees, Local 286;
(e) Tile w·orkers represented by United Steelworkers
of America, Locals 4329, 4347, 4413 and 5120;
and
(f) Elvere R. Davis, individually, and as a member of
his local union.
3. That· the unemployment of the claimants represented

13
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by the local unions set forth in 2. (a through f above) was
due to a work stoppage that resulted because of a strike
involving his grade, class or group of workers at the factory
or establishment at which he is or was last employed.

ARGUMENT

I.
The Board of Review erred as a matter of law and fact in
denying the claimants benefits in holding:
( 1 ) That Utah Copper Division, KennecoH Copper Corporation, operation in Utah constitutes a single factory or
establishment within the meaning of the act, Secti·on 5 (d).

Section 35-4-5 (d) of the Utah Employment Security Act
provides:
5. An individual shall be ineligible for benefits or
for purposes of establishing a waiting period:
cc

(d) For any week in which it is found by the commission that his unemployment is due to a stoppage of
work which exists because of a strike involving his
grade, class, or group of workers at the factory or
establishment in which he is or was last employed.
n

ct (

1) If the commission, upon investigation, shall

find a strike has been fomented by a worker of any
employer, none of the workers of that grade, class, or
group of \vorkers of the individual who is found
being a party of such plan or agreement to fon1ent a
strike, shall be eligible for benefits; provided, however,
that if the commission, upon investigation, shall find
that such strike is caused by the failure or refusal of
any employer to conform to the provisions of any law
14
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of the State of Utah, or of the United State, pertaining to hours, wages or other conditions of work, such
strike shall not render the workers ineligible for
benefits.
'' ( 2) If the commission upon investigation, shall
find that the employer, his agent, or representative, has
conspired, planned or agreed with any of his workers,
their agents or representatives, to foment a strike, such
strike shall not render the workers ineligible for benefits."
The pivotal and basic question of law to be resolved
from all of the facts in this consolidated petition requires a
determination as to whether Utah Copper Division, Kennecott
Copper Corporation's operations in Utah constitutes a single
factory or establishment within the meaning of the act.
Claimants have carefully reviewed the prior rulings of
this court annotated and cited, Operating Engineers, Local
Union No. 3, v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 318 P. 2d
336, and conclude that the factual situation existing here distinguishes these cases from the prior cited cases which seem
to settle the law.
In Operating Engineers, Local Union No. 3, supra, the
court held that the strike of one union would be intended
as a pressure beneficial to all 11 unions. The case answers
only the question of the group involved and does not resolve
the issue of a single establishment.,
n

Nor do any of the cases therein cited, in our view, namely,
Iron Workers t'. Industrial Comntission. 104 Utah 242, 139
P. 2d 208; Olof Nelson Constfuction Company z·. Industrial
Conllnission, 121 Utah 525, 243 P. 2d 951, and Teamsters,

15
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etc., v. Orange Transportation Company, 5 Utah 2d 45, 296
P. 2d 291, answer the question raised here.
Those cases were decided on the basis of what constitutes
a "group" within the meaning of the statute. To our knowledge
the Utah Supreme Court has not definitely wrestled with the
problem before of a (single establishrnent,'' and determination
of this question is the basic predicate upon which the qualification or disqualification of the claimants involved must be
decided.
t

The common denominator used by the Appeals Referee
and the Board of Review is contained in BR-236 (R. 052),
company Exhibit B, entitled ((The Utah Copper Story 1959.''
This document was received in evidence by the Appeals Referee
to assist him insofar as he adopted ((integral functioning" as
a basic test of the extent of an ((establishment." Apparently
the Appeals Referee and Board of Review considered the
evidence and testimony relating to management and operation
of the Utah Copper Division as the chief test. All the findings
in all the cases involved the finding in BR-236 (R. 109) :
(On the basis of both general and specific business
administration and control as well as proximity,
integrality and interdependence of various production
departments, it must be considered that the entire physical plant of the Utah Copper Division of the Kennecott
Copper Corporation constitutes one establishment at
which the clain1ants in this case were employed."
t

These findings entirely disregard the various departments,
mine, mills, central power station, metallurgical laboratory,
smelter, refinery and maintenance shops as separate establishments and in so doing run against the employer and en1ployee
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relationship differences demonstrated by the record. The
Appeals Referee \Vas itnpressed that the mine, mills, refinery,
sn1elter, po¥:er station, haulage system, etc., were all simply
interdependent units within the general establishment. This
n1ay be in keeping with some decisions on this point, but there
is substantial law to the contrary.
A con1 parison of the pertinent contract provisions existing
between the various local unions and the company will demonstrate that:

( 1) 'The union recognized as the sole bargaining agent
for the employees of a particular unit, in most cases, arose out
of National Labor Relations Board election procedures, and
in some cases it is a matter of common knowledge that jurisdiction for these jobs was hard fought between the unions themselves.

( 2) In all steelworkers' contracts, rates of pay are determined by job evaluation studies. The steelworkers are a
vertical industrial union. Central Power House Station, Local
1438, is not an industrial union, but is a craft of electrical
workers. This is true of the machinists local and railroad local.
( 3) The \vages established for craft locals is a bargained
rate without regard to increments and job evaluation.
( 4) There is contractual difference in the health and
v1elfare insurance, and the carriers who provide the coverage
for the various claimants and their several local unions.
It is uncontroverted that employees at the refinery do
not have the right to bump across to the smelter or mine or
mill or vice-versa. The refinery was during the period of time
involved in this dispute headed by a separate superintendent
17
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as was the smelter, as was the mine, the mill department, the
central power station, etc. Hiring practices were clearly separate and distinct. Seniority differs pursuant to each contract.
Vacation and fringe benefits are not identical, nor did the
company introduce in evidence any uniform working rules
applicable to all the departments.
Scrutiny of this record will disclose these historic and
contractual differences among the employees, indeed even
among the various locals. True, we have here one single employing unit, but that does not necessarily render that single
employing unit a separate establishment within the meaning
of the law. A partnership which operates three bowling alleys
and a bottling concern may be a single employing unit, but
each of the establishments may be separate. See Canada Dry
Bottling Company v. Board of Review, 223 P.2d 586.
See Nordling v. Ford Motor Company, 231 Minn. 68,
42 N.W. 2d 576, 28 A.L.R. 2d 272, which holds:
((The question whether the assembly plant was an
establishment separate from the manufacturing plant,
or whether both were parts of the same establishment,
should be determined, under all the facts available,
from the standpoint of unlike employment rather than
of management; that the test of functional integrality,
general unity and physical proximity should not be
adopted as absolute, but merely as elements to be taken
into consideration with other factors."
The Supreme Court of Michigan, recently reversing its
former ruling in Ch1-ysler Corporation v. Smith, 297 Mich .
.·!.38, 298 N.W. 870, 28 A.L.R. 2d 327, now establishes a
highly sensible rationale in vte\v of the liberal construction
18
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necessarily required in making determinations as to unemployment compensation eligibility.

A thoughtrul reading of Park v. Appeal Board of Michigan
(January 12, 1959), 359 Mich. 103, 94 N.W. 2d 407,
points up the complexity of the problem surrounding a finding
of ··establishment.''
Certainly it is good public policy to see the end of an
involved lengthy strike such as this. The steelworkers local,
who were obtaining meager strike benefits from their international, were automatically cut off from those benefits on
November 21, 1959, through their settlement. Yet they \vere
penalized until February 6, 1960, by the Appeals Referee
finding that the plant only then returned to normal operations.
A denial of unemployment compensation for those for whom
work \Vas unavailable constitutes a double penalty of the loss
of statutory benefits as well as union benefits. Should the steel·workers have refused to have settled until all 19 unions
settled, and thus risk a delay in ultimately ending the strike
in order to retain their own strike benefits because the policy
of the law was to continue their disqualification? We think
the question answers itself, and particularly where the evidence
sho\vs that commencing November 23 through 27, the smelter
and refinery had resumed substantial operations with their
production, maintenance and clerical crews. Even if refusal
to cross the picket lines of the railroad brotherhoods set up
December 2 and withdrawn December 25, 1959, was disqualifying, ho"' does the Board sustain continuing disqualification after all picket lines were withdrawn from the refinery
and smelter on December 26, 1959, and those two units returned
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to substantial operations to smelt and refine the ore concentrates stockpiled for the company's original vacation shutdown
planned in August, 1959? How did the company regard
these smelter and refinery workers after the concentrates and
ore supply was exhausted? They laid off men pursuant to
seniority and qualifications, gave each of them a blue separation
slip, conceded that, ((there was no work available," and observed seniority in recall.
And, how did the Board of Review regard Local Union
1438, Electrical Workers? That decision contains no finding
that these claimants disaffirmed the strike and by letters of
October 31 and November 2, 1959, actually reinstituted employer relationship on a day-to-day basis, returning six or
seven employees to the Central Power House because no others
were needed; yet, the company purchased substantial power
from the local public utility to meet its demands. How the
Board concluded in this case that other members of Local
1438 refused to cross a picket line is an anomaly. If the con1pany had no work available for the remaining 60 to 70 men,
having exercised its prerogative to purchase power, what does
it matter that they refused to cross a picket line if there was
no work available for them?
Elvere R. Davis was not even an employee of the company
on August 7, 1959, when he received his separation notice.
Yet, Mr. Davis was disqualified as if he were still a member
of the local union involved in the strike.
The solution is not to be found merely in physical isolation
of the various properties, nor geographical proximity, nor in
the schen1e of management, supervision and production. At
20
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nuntn1un1, this court should remand these cases to the Board
of Review to n1ake ~indings and give consideration to the source
of authority in hiring and discharging employees, to the manne~·
of seniority practices, and other differences betv1een the 19
unions and the company which demonstrate separateness.
Under the circumstances all employment practices, rather than
those of management and operation, are of primary importance
in determining the unity and integrality or the lack of unity
and lack of integrality of the claimants. The dependence of
one or more of the company's departments upon Division
Office control and supervision, does not necessarily make of
the entire industry one plant or one establishment any more
than by a pyramiding of corporate structures, the Utah Copper
Division can be keyed to its Ray Mines Division, its South
American operations, or, in turn, to its Eastern refineries. See
Tucker ·v. Anzerican Smelting & Refining Company, 189 Md.
250, 55 A. 2d 692, where the court ruled employees of a
Balitmore refinery eligible because of a strike in this same
Utah smelter when both plants were owned by ASARCO.
The danger with such easy reasoning is that we will ultimately
pyramid upon any manufacturer who might regularly buy
materials and supplies from certain suppliers, a result which
the unemployment statutes do not contemplate.
\Vith these factors in mind, let us consider Park z). Appe(t!
Board of lviicbigan (supra).
At pp. 412-413:
((Judges and lawyers can frequently do astonishing
things with words. No layman would venture to suggest that the single word (establishment', used in the
paragraph above, could in normal usage be applied
21
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to both the Ford Rouge plant in Dearborn, Michigan,
and the Ford forge plant in Canton, Ohio.
((The writer believes also that no layman, without
a specific motive in mind, would read the statutory
provisions quoted above and come to the conclusion
that the legislature had any such inclusiveness in its
intended use of the word. Although the statute carries
within it no definition of (establishment,' its use of
the term is, in our opinion, such as clearly to rule out
the broad interpretation sought by appellees. Thus,
the statute defines the term (employing unit' in the
same broad sense which appellees seek to apply to
(establishment':
( ((Employing unit" means any individual or type
of organization, including any partnership, association, trust, estate, joint-stock company, insurance
company or corporation, whether domestic or foreign, * * * '
((And, in the second sentence of the same definition
paragraph, it makes such use of the word c establishment' as, in our view, to preclude any attempt at definition in terms of all integrated plants of a company,
wherever located:
CAll individuals performing services \Yithin this
state for any employing unit which maintains 2 or
more separate establishments \vithin this state shall
be deetned to be employed by a single employing unit
for all the purposes of this act.' "
See the identical definition contained under the Utah Act,
3 5-4-22 (h).
At pp. 416-419:
(CAs \ve have previously noted, compensation was
allo\ved in 8 of these 9 cases after rejection of the
22
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argument that Ford Motor Company integration rendered the individual far-flung plants 1 establishment
with the Ford Rouge plant in Dearborn, Michigan. The
exception was the Georgia case, where the Georgia
supreme court rejected liberal construction of the unemployn1ent cotnpensation act and flatly stated with a
finality unhampered by excess concern for fine definition or logic:
'We therefore hold that the Hapeville plant, at
which the claimants were employed, and the Dearborn parts-producing plant, where the strike occurred
and which compelled cessation of work at the Hapeville plant, were inseparable and indispensable parts
of one and the same ((factory, establishment, or
other premises" as contemplated by those terms as
employed in the act now being construed.' Ford
Motor Co. v. Abercombie, 207 Ga. 464, 470, 62
S.E. 2d 209, 215.
'"The balance of the courts followed definition of
the word 'establishment' very similar to that which we
have referred to. The New Jersey supreme court held:
'The standard of "functional integration" is not
to be found in the legislative expression. The statutory sense of the term "establishment" is not embracive of the whole of Ford's far-flung enterprise
as a single industrial unit. It has reference to a
distinct physical place of business. Such is its normal
usage in business and in government. A. H. Phillips,
Inc. v. Walling, 1945, 324 U.S. 490, 65 S. Ct. 807,
89 L. Ed. 1095. ((Establishment" is defined as the
((place where one is permanently fixed for residence
or business;" also, "an institution or place of business.
Webster's New International Dictionary,
2d ed.' Ford Motor Co. v. New Jersey Department
of Labor and Industry, 5 N.J. 494, 502, 76 A.2d
256, 260.
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C!The Virginia supreme court, with reasontng ,I've
consider sound, held:
(The Unemployment Compensation Act, * * * was
intended to provide temporary financial assistance
to workmen who became unemployed without fault
on their part. The statute as a whole, as well as the
particular sections here involved, should be so interpreted as to effectuate that remedial purpose
implicit in its enactment. When its purpose is kept
in view, we cannot agree that managerial and operational integration and functional cooperation upon
the official level are to be the chief factors upon
which employment status and employees' rights are
to be determined. Our problem is, in the final analysis, to recognize the remedial aim and purpose of
the Act and then interpret and construe the language
and apply it to the facts proved. In doing this, we
do not think that the contractual obligations and relations brought about through execution of the master
labor contract by Ford Motor Co. and UAW-CIO
may be considered as determining whether or not
the Norfolk plant and the Rouge plant constitute
and are one establishment within the meaning of the
statute. Those plants either constitute one establishment or separate establishments regardless of whether
the master labor contract is or is not in force. The
circumstances of employment, rather than those of
management and operation, are of primary importance in determining the unity and integration, or
the lack of unity and integration of the plants.
The accumulative weight and effect of these circumstances \Ve think, are sufficient to sho\v that
the Norfolk assembly plant is separate from the
Rouge plant. No labor dispute or strike was fomented
or participated in by the local union to \vhich the
clai1nant employees belong, nor was there any labor
dispute on the premises, at the plant, or in the establishment 'vhere they were actually employed. The
24
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labor dispute and resultant strike were in fact and
in reality at and in Dearborn. The most that can be
said is that the management and operation of the
vast and far-flung Ford Motor industry is so integrated and synchronized that a serious strike at its
headquarters and in its principal plants at Dearborn
must in time affect the entire industry and cause the
shutdown of plants and other establishments wherever situated. The dependence of one or more plants
in this great industry upon the home office and principal manufacturing establishment does not, however, necessarily make of the entire industry one
plant or one establishment.' Ford Motor Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 191 Va.
812, 824, 825, 63 S.E. 2d 28, 33.
ccln a number of cases we have referred to, the act
construed referred to 'factory, establishment or other
pren1ises, as was true in the draft version of the model
statute. In the case arising from the shut down of the
St. Paul, Minnesota, assembly plant, the word Hestablishment' was employed alone after amendment had
deleted the accompanying words 'factory' and 'other
premises'-in short, the san1e situation as prevails at
present in relation to our Michigan statute.
nln a very similar fact situation with a very similar
statutory provision to construe, the Minnesota court
set forth .the following analysis of the (establishment'
problem on which we do not think we can improve:
(Rather than distinguish the cases on differing
facts, we prefer to place decision on the broader
ground that we believe that the test of functional
integrality, general unity, and physical proximity
should not be adopted as an absolute test in all cases
of this type. No doubt, these factors are elements
that should be taken into consideration in determining the ultimate question of whether a factory plant,
or unit of .'1 larger industry is a separate establish25

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ment within the meaning of our employer and
security law. However, there are other factors which
must also be taken into consideration. The difficulty
with attempting to use, as an absolute test, the factors
laid down in the Spielman case comes in its application to the facts of a particular case. Many enterprises have functional integrality between factories
which are separtaely owned. Some are so integrated
in part with units or factories having the satne O\vnership and in part with factories or plants which are
independently owned. That is the situation which
we have in the instant case. Out of some 3,800 or
4,000 parts, about 900 come from the Rouge plant.
Some come from other plants owned by the Ford
Motor Company, and still others come from plants
independently owned. A shutdown caused by a strike
or other labor dispute at one of such independent
vendors might conceivably cause a shutdown at the
St. Paul Ford plant. This did actually happen in
1945, when a strike occurred at the Kelsey Hayes
plant. We assume that it is not uncommon that the
same international union would represent the employes of several independent plants or factories
operating as the Ford plant does with its independent
vendors, but we do not believe that anyone would
contend that a strike at the plant of such independent
vendor would disqualify employes of the Ford plant
if it was forced to shut down on account of the lack
of parts furnished by such independent vendor.
(Proximity is equally unsatisfactory. In order to
apply this factor, what distance shall be considered
short enough to constitute proximity? Shall the
St. Paul branch of the Ford plant be close enough
to the Rouge plant and the Georgia or Los Angeles
plants, operating in a similar manner, be too far
a\vay, or shall any two plants any,vhere in the lJniteJ
States be near enough?
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'Nor is general unity of itself a test. Our statutes
recognize that the same employing unit may maintain two or more separate establishments within
the State. § 268.04, subd. 9. It might be argued that
the legislature had in mind separate establishments
\vhich are not related in any way, but the legislature
did not so state, and we do not believe it can be
read into the statute. In A. H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 65 S. Ct. 807, 89 L.Ed 1095, 157
A.L.R. 876, supra, there was general unity, but that
did not prevent the court from holding that the
warehouse was an establishment separate from the
retail part of the business.
'If, then, these tests standing alone do not suffice,
is it a combination of all of them which makes them
sufficient? If one is lacking, are the others sufficient,
or must they all concur? We believe the better rule
to be that these factors, together with other facts,
must be taken into consideration in determining
whether the unit under consideration is in fact a
separate establishment from the standpoint of employment. The St. Paul branch of the Ford Motor
Company is highly integrated with other units of
the company for purposes of efficient management
and operation, but is separate insofar as the employes
are concerned for the purpose of employment. The
employes are hired and discharged by the St. Paul
manager. They are members of a local union which
has no connection with the locals at Dearborn except
that all locals are members of the same international,
as are many others not connected with the Ford
Motor Company. The seniority rights of the employes
extend only to operations at the St. Paul plant. No
showing has been made, nor do we believe that any
can be made, that an employe at the St. Paul branch
can "bump" an employe at the Rouge plant, the Los
Angeles plant, the Georgia plant, or anywhere else
27
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than at the St. Paul plant. Payment to the Minnesota unemployment compensation fund is made only
for employes at the St. Paul plant, and, obviously,
benefits can be drawn only by employes in the St.
Paul branch from the Minnesota fund. Employment
under the act relates to services performed within
the State or localized here. The members of Local
8 79 had nothing to do with calling the strike at
the Rouge plant and could do nothing to avert it.
While the record does not so show, "'e assume that
under our act the contribution rate of the employer
is based on the experience ratio of employes within
this state without any regard to the experience in
other states.
(Under § 5 (d) of the act proposed by the Social
Security Board and under our original act, the unit
of employment within which the labor dispute must
exist in order to disqualify was designated as the
rrfactory establishment, or other premises at which
he is or was last employed." (Italics supplied.)
Under our present act, § 268.09, subd. 1 ( 6), the
strike or labor dispute must be in progress ctat the
establishment in which he is or was employed."
(Italics supplied). It is doubtful that the change
in terminology was intended to enlarge or diminish
the unit of employment affecting the disqualification.
It has been held that the words t(factory, establishment or other premises" in the Alaska act, which
is similar to the Federal act, were ejusdem generis
and that the principle of noscitur a sociis applies.
Aragon v. Unemployment Compensation Comm.,
9 Cir., 149 F.2d 447, supra.
(We are inclined to believe that in our original
act the word establishment" was intended to include
those places of etnployment \vhich could not be classified as a factory; that in the amendment the legisH
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lature concluded that the term "establishment" was
inclusive of factory and all other types of employer
units; and that there was no further need to use the
word ufactory." For a discussion of the distinction
between factory and establishment, see General
Motors Corp. v. Mulquin, 134 Conn. 118, 55 A.2d
732, supra.
'The term "establishment" as used in our amended
act should be given no broader meaning than it had
in the original act, except that it now includes "factory" and "other premises" set out separately in the
original act. Our Act, patterned after the act proposed by the Social Security Board, is in turn patterned after the British National Insurance Act of
1911 ( 1 & 2 George V, c. 55, pt. 2 § 87), which
was amended in 1935 (25 George V. c. 8, pt. 3,
§ 26). Under both the 1911 and the 1935 British
acts, disqualification is based upon a \vork stoppage
due to a trade dispute at the rrfactory workshop or
other premises" (italics supplied) at which the
claimant is employed. The British umpire, which is
the final arbiter under the British act, has consistently
held that the words ''factory, workshop or other
premises," refer to single units of employment. The
only substantial change in the language of our original act from the British act was that the word
"establishment" was substituted for ((workshop." It
is difficult to believe that this change was intended
to broaden the scope of the employment area so as
to emcompass a whole industry rather than a single
unit of employment.' Nordling v. Ford Motor Co.,
231 Minn. 68, 85-89, 42 N.W. 2d 576, 586."
Appellants also make brief reference to Tennessee Coal,
Iron & Railroad Co. v. Martin, 251 Ala. 153, 36 So. 2d 547.
There the employer argued for disqualification of non-striking
members of the United Mine Workers. Yet, their coal mining
29
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operations were shut down as a result of strikes by other unions
in the steel making and ore mining operations of the company.
The Alabama supreme court rejected the integration argument,
holding that the words of their act must be interpreted as they
are ··commonly used and understood.''
See also, Shell Oil v. Cummins} 70 Ill. 2d 329, 131 N.E.
2d 64. There 12 metal trade unions were not barred by joint
negotiations as directly interested or as men1bers of the same
grade.

II.
The Board of Review erred as a matter of law and fact in
denying the claimants benefits in holding:
( 2) That the work stoppage did not end until February
6, 1960, when the plant resumed "normal operations" for:
(a) the workers represented by United Steelworkers
of America, Local 5486;
(b) the workers represented by International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 1438;
(c) t·he workers represented by International Union
of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, Locals 485
and 392;
(d) the workers represented by International Union
of Office Employees, Local 286;
(e) the workers represented by United Steelworkers
of America, Locals 4329,4347,4413 and 5120;
(f) Elvere R. Davis, individually, and as a member of
his local Union.
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hile this court has never been confronted with the
necessity of interpreting the extent of the meaning of the
words "stoppage of work" in connection with a particular
strike ,there are cases in other jurisdictions which have decided
the disqualification does not end at the time the labor dispute
is settled, but continues while they are unemployed as a result
of the labor dispute. SeeCarne gie-Illinois Steel Corporation t:.
Rerieu' Boat"d. 117 Ind. App. 379, 72 N.E. 2d 622, and Bako
z·. Board of Review (Penn.) 90 A.2d 302.
\X,

But the foregoing cases are not necessarily determinative
of the issues here since the basic qualification finding required
in the first sentence of Section 35-4-5 (d) nat the factory or
establishment at which he is or was last employed" must be
legally made before the casual proviso becomes effective and
before considering or applying the test of direct involvement
set forth in subsection (d) 1.
Ill.
The Board of Review erred as a matter of law and fact
in denying the claimants benefits in holding:
( 3) That the unemployment of the claimants represented

by the local unit)ns set forth in 2. (a through f above) was
due to a work stoppage that resulted because of a strike involving his grade, class or group of workers at the factory
or establishment at which he is or was last employed.
Again \ve are concerned with the basic qualification f1nding
required in the first sentence of Section 35-4-5(d) \vhich must
be made as the predicate before the further finding of involvement of grade, class or group of workers.
~1
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The variety of work performed by the complex employee
units has no comparison or sim.ilarity in bargaining history
and contractual results with similar job grade, class or group
of workers in any other units involved in the strike. The
ratification and strike settlement of each local union would
seem to argue for the end of that particular unit's disqualification. Lexes v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 243 P.2d
964, does not appear to control since the jobs of the railroad
switchmen were actually absorbed into the steelworkers' unit,
and there is no comparable fact situation in any of the instant
cases.
Analysis of the bargaining contracts of all these local
unions, we believe, forecloses the Board of Review from making
a broad finding that all employees collectively involved the
same grade, class or group of workers at ccthe factory or
establishment" at which he is or was last employed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons cited in this brief, we submit this court
should reverse the Board of Review's decision and order that
each grade, class and group of workers at each of the separate
establishments, within the Utah Copper Division of Kennecott,
be determined eligible for unemployment compensation benefits
commencing with the date that each local ended its strike
against the company and ratified a strike settlement agreement.
Respectfully submitted this 20th day of December, 1960.
A. WALLY SANDACK
Attorney for Appellants
405 Executive Building
Salt Lake City 11, Utah
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